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Europhile against all odds: social democrats converge on a 
pro-integration position in times of politicisation 
 
Mario Gavenda 
How do pro-European parties of the centre-left react to growing citizen dissatisfaction with the EU? In this 
research note, Mario Gavenda argues that the social-democratic party family in Western Europe remains 
persistently in favour of European integration. A content analysis of party congress debates of the German 
SPD and the French PS suggests that social democrats take a position of critical Euroenthusiasm, criticising 
the status quo but demanding ‘more Europe’ as solution.  
 
In recent years, the crisis-ridden European 
Union has lost considerably in citizens’ trust 
and became the object of fierce political 
debate in a number of member states. For 
pro-European forces on the centre-left, the 
constraints of a sceptical popular opinion are 
complemented by the way the Euro crisis and 
its management has belied many of the social 
promises of European integration. It is thus 
fair to expect that social-democratic parties 
tone down their pro-integration position in 
line with the scepticism of a considerable 
portion of their core electorate. 
The empirical data in Table 1, summarizing the 
EU party positions of 15 major Western 
European centre-left parties, clearly 
contradicts this expectation. Not only has the 
mean EU position of the centre-left remained 
strongly favourable to integration (hovering 
around a value of 6 out of 7), but the 
differences between the parties have 
diminished as well. The numbers highlighted in 
bold show the standard deviation dropping 
from 0.64 in 1999 to below 0.44 in 2014. 
Further, consider Figure 1 which shows the 
left-right positions and attitudes towards 
Europe found in social-democratic election 
manifestoes from 1980 to 2015. We see that 
the left-right and EU positions of the parties 
develop almost synchronously from the 1980s 
to the late 2000s, reflecting the growing 
acceptance of European market integration in 
the context of a general dilution of left-wing 
economic attitudes since the 1970s. Since the 
onset of the global and European economic 
crises, we detect a curious break in this 
pattern. Now, the two lines develop in 
opposite directions. The parties move 
decisively to the left – perhaps in reaction to 
the perceived failure of economic 
liberalisation – to reach levels below -20 for 
the first time since the 1970s. The positions 
on European integration however reach 
unprecedentedly high levels in the positive.  
Table 1. Summary statistics of EU positions of West European social-democratic parties 
Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1999 15 6.3101 .6425514 5.142857 7 
2002 15 6.053333 .5638473 5.13 6.86 
2006 15 6.0004 .6270563 5 7 
2010 15 5.980993 .5634423 4.8 7 
2014 15 6.01066 .4342814 5.272727 6.7 
Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File. 
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Figure 1. Mean left/right and EU position of West European social-democratic parties, 1980-2015 
 
Source: Manifest Project Dataset (version 2016a). 
What drives this novel development? To 
answer this question, I conducted a detailed 
content analysis of party congress documents 
of the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD) 
and the French Socialist Party (PS). In contrast 
to most studies of EU party position, the data 
distinguishes between evaluations of the 
current state of EU affairs and demands as to 
the further course of integration.  
Table 2 presents a cross tabulation of the 
various political demands and the evaluations 
that were made in motions submitted to the 
party congresses of the PS and the SPD 
between 2005 and 2015 by a wide array of 
party actors (such as party executives, 
ideological factions, or local party groups). It 
shows that social-democratic EU debates are 
dominated by calls for more Europe, which 
make up over 50% of all claims at party 
congresses in both countries, while over 20% 
of statements call for a reform of the current 
system. The motions voice outright 
opposition to the transfer of powers to the 
EU level or to individual European projects 
only in isolated cases.   
Table 2. Co-occurrences of integration demands and EU evaluations in party congress motions 
PS 
of which… 
SPD 
of which… 
negative 
30,8 
neutral 
54,1 
positive 
15,1 
negative 
23,0 
neutral 
61,9 
positive 
15,1 More EU 57,0 More EU 50,3 
Reform EU 19,4 67,5 23,4 9,1 Reform EU 20,2 51,8 40,7 7,5 
Less EU 1,3 92,3 7,7 0,0 Less EU 4,3 68,5 25,9 5,6 
Note: The percentages in the table together with claims coded ‘no demand’ (not displayed) add up 
to 100%. PS: 2005-2015; SPD: 2005-2013. N = 2266. Source: Author's own data. 
 
Social democrats want more Europe to 
overcome perceived failures of the EU 
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To make sense of the motivations behind the 
demands, consider further the percent shares 
of the different evaluations that are made in 
conjunction with the demands. In both parties, 
claims for more integration are often made 
alongside a negative evaluation of the current 
state of affairs (30% and 23% respectively, 
while the positive integrationist statements 
make up 15%). This suggests that social 
democrats do not necessarily want to give the 
EU more powers because they are satisfied 
with its current performance, but on the 
contrary because they perceive the limited 
competences of the European level as a cause 
of the current problems. Moving from single 
statements to the level of party congresses, 
Figure 2 shows a clear correlation between 
critical EU evaluations and integrationist 
demands, with the 2007 SPD party congress 
as a sole outlier (it is important to note that 
this congress followed Germany’s presidency 
of the Council of the EU in the first half of 
2007, in which the SPD participated as junior 
government coalition partner). The higher the 
EU integration demand score, the lower the 
EU evaluation score.  
 
Figure 2. EU evaluation and EU integration demand scores per party congress 
 
Note: EU integration demand score scale: 1 = all coded claims call for more integration; 0 = all coded 
claims call for less integration. EU evaluation score: 1= all coded claims put forward a positive 
evaluation; 0 = all coded claims put forward a negative evaluation. Source: Author's own data.
This overall picture allows us to conclude that 
social democrats become more enthusiastic 
about EU-level solutions the more dissatisfied 
they are with the status quo in the current 
era of crisis and politicisation. This suggests 
that the parties recognise – at least in their 
internal debates – that the current shape of 
the EU is often at odds with their core 
objectives, but have given up on the idea to 
pursue their goals within the framework of 
nation states alone and rather see more 
integration  as  the  solution. This attitude can  
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A critical pro-integration message is good 
news for EU democracy 
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be best described as critical Euroenthusiasm. 
While this finding may disappoint observers 
who consider an integrationist centre-left 
strategy a dead-end, it should please those 
who see politicisation as an opportunity to 
democratise the EU. A more coherent left 
project that puts forward alternative EU 
policies could offer dissatisfied citizens 
something to vote for, and thereby alleviate 
opposition to the EU polity as a whole. For 
the time being, only little of this materialises in 
public discourse and the policy-making 
practices of the EU. It is up to social 
democrats to take serious their own 
programmes and membership preferences to 
deliver a more viable politicisation of the EU.  
 
This post represents the views of the author and not those of PADEMIA. It is based on parts of Mario 
Gavenda’s doctoral dissertation. 
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